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When it becomes necessary for a State to declare 
itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it 
becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a 
fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always the 
measure which is both least dishonourable to the 
debtor and least hurtful to the creditor. 
 
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776 (at 416) 
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“Sovereign debt” 1  is the debt owed, guaranteed or secured by the central 
government of a State, an agency or instrumentality thereof.2  
States can borrow from a variety of sources. They can receive loans from 
international financial institutions (IMF, WB, and MDBs), foreign governments 
and commercial banks (either individually or as part of a syndicate), or they can 
issue sovereign bonds on the international capital markets. 
In the 19th century and in the early years of the 20th century, most sovereign 
debt was in the form of bonds or loans disbursed by private banks providing mainly 
short-term trade financing or interbank credit lines. To deal with sovereign defaults, 
bondholders’ committees3 were established and, occasionally, western powers even 
engaged in “gunboat diplomacy” to recover debts owed to their nationals.  
After World War II, government-to-government loans became the preeminent 
form of borrowing and sovereign debt restructurings were dealt with by the Paris 
Club, an informal group of official creditors. 
 
1  State indebtedness may be either external or domestic. While a State’s domestic debt is 
predominantly held by residents and is usually denominated in domestic currency, governed by 
national law and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts, public external debt is the 
debt a country owes to non-residents, including governments, international financial institutions and 
commercial banks. It is often denominated in a foreign currency, governed by a foreign law and 
subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court. 
2 Recently, the issue of the so-called “quasi-sovereign debt” has been raised, which refers to the 
debt incurred by subnational political entities (provinces, municipalities and the like), and by State-
owned enterprises. While State-owned enterprises are usually able to borrow externally even when 
the government does not guarantee its repayment, in some cases the administrative regions of 
sovereign States are prohibited to do so by law (for example, in the United Kingdom, but not in the 
United States). The global financial crisis highlighted the problems related to the debt owed by 
public enterprises, which in some cases was restructured on the same basis as sovereign debt, while 
in others was dealt with through the relevant domestic bankruptcy regime. See U. Das, M. 
Papaioannou, C. Trebesch, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and 
Stylized Facts” (2012) IMF Working Paper, WP/12/203, p. 56 ff. and A. Gelpern, “Bankruptcy, 
Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt” (2012) Yale Law Journal 121, pp. 888-942. 
3 Before World War I, when bonds were still the predominant form of sovereign borrowing, 
bondholders had few legal remedies against a defaulting State. At the time, States enjoyed absolute 
sovereign immunity and bond investors (mainly banks) could recover their investment only by 
seeking diplomatic protection or through negotiations. To this end, committees were established in 
the United Kingdom and in the United States to represent the interests of bondholders and to lobby 
their own governments, but with negligible effects. In 1868, in the UK, a consortium of loan houses 
and brokers created the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. In the United States, the Foreign 
Bondholders Protective Council was established in 1933 under the Roosevelt administration to 
protect the interests of holders of foreign bonds and to negotiate with governments that defaulted on 
their debts. See P. Mauro and Y. Yafeh, “The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders” (2003) IMF 
Working Paper, WP/03/107; M. R. Adamson, “The Failure of the Foreign Bondholders Protective 
Council Experiment, 1934-1940” (2002) The Business History Review, Vol. 76, No. 3, pp. 479-514. 
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It was only in the 1970s that States started to borrow from international 
commercial banks through long-term syndicated credit agreements.4 During the 
1980s, however, the majority of emerging countries defaulted on their bank loans, 
which had to be restructured by small banks’ committees, collectively referred to 
as the London Club.  
During the 1990s, bank lending to emerging economies declined as compared to 
sovereign bond financing and nowadays the external debt of sovereigns is mainly 
held in the form of bonds. Sovereign bonds are actively traded in secondary markets 
and held by a broad community of investors. Current bondholders include many 
categories of creditors, both domestic and foreign, which range from retail to 
institutional investors (banks, investment funds, hedge funds, pension funds, and 
insurance companies), also encompassing sovereign wealth funds, central banks, 
the IMF and similar international organizations, as well as supranational institutions 
like the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank. Bond investors, 
however, are usually not represented in bondholders’ committees, and 
restructurings take the form of sovereign bond exchanges. 
It is clear from the above that, over the past sixty years, the features of sovereign 
debt restructurings have been shaped by the type of creditors and by the nature of 
the debt. Debt restructuring vehicles therefore change according to the category of 
creditors involved: (a) official bilateral debt is renegotiated under the Paris Club 
umbrella; (b) commercial bank debt is restructured through the so-called London 
Club process or Bank Advisory Committees; and (c) bond debt is restructured via 
exchange offers. 
The purpose of the following chapter is to assess whether, in light of recent 
developments, the Paris and the London Clubs can still play a leading role in 
sovereign debt restructurings. 
 
4 During the 1970s, bank lending to emerging market countries usually took the form of a 
syndicated loan, a club loan or a single-bank loan. Under a syndicated credit agreement, the 
borrowing country selects one or several commercial banks to act as arranger or co-arrangers against 
the payment of a fee. The arranger agrees to provide a share of the loan, prepares the terms of the 
syndicated credit agreement and sells portions of the loan to other participants. To facilitate the 
process of administering the loan on a daily basis, one bank from the syndicate is appointed as agent. 
Principal and interest payments are made by the borrower to the agent, which is responsible for their 
transfer to each syndicated member according to its share of the loan. 
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After an analysis of the Paris and the London Clubs, which developed as the 
preferred fora for the restructuring of debts owed by a State to homogeneous groups 
of creditors (other States and commercial banks respectively), this study will focus 
on the creditor structure of sovereign bonds.  
It is argued that the fragmentation of the bondholders’ profile can pose a host of 
complex issues to the development of a dedicated workout mechanism for the 
restructuring of sovereign bond debt. In particular, the challenges posed by 
supranational bondholders are yet to be carefully addressed, while the principles 
and practices developed by the Paris and the London Clubs can only be of a limited 
use. 
 
2. The Paris Club 
2.1 Origins and nature of the Paris Club 
The Paris Club is the leading intergovernmental forum to restructure official 
bilateral debt, which is debt owed by – or guaranteed by – a national government 
to other countries. 
The Paris Club gathered informally for the first time in 1956 to deal with 
Argentina’s default and its creation is seen by many as stemming from the spirit of 
multilateralism in international relations prevailing in the aftermath of World War 
II. Its predecessor was the Club of The Hague, set up in 1955 by six European 
countries seeking a common approach to the renegotiation of the Brazilian debt.5 
In its current configuration, the Paris Club is composed of 22 permanent 
members (with South Korea and Brazil joining in 20166). They represent a group 
of countries with common interests and large credit exposure to other States.7  
 
5 The aim of the Club of The Hague was to avoid the creation of unfair preferences among 
creditors, which were considered against the spirit of cooperation of the members of the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The IMF, the IBRD and the OEEC took 
part in the negotiations as observers.  
Brazil had to reschedule its debt within the Club of The Hague a second time in 1961 and a third 
one in 1964. After the third debt agreement with Brazil, the Club of The Hague ceased to exist. 
6 The sharp rise in emerging market borrowing in the aftermath of the financial crisis encouraged 
official creditors to expand the Paris Club membership amid the re-emerging threat of debt crises in 
poorer nations. 
7 The twenty-two permanent members of the Paris Club are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 




Other official creditors may attend the Club negotiation sessions as ad hoc 
participants, subject to the agreement of the permanent members and of the debtor 
State.8 
Usually, both permanent members and ad hoc participants are represented by 
senior officers from the Ministry of Finance. 
Since 1961, representatives of the IMF and the IBRD are invited to Club 
meetings as observers, to provide information and technical advice.9 The OECD, 
the UNCTAD, 10  the European Commission and four multilateral development 
banks (the African Bank of Development, the Asian Bank of Development, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank) also attend negotiation meetings. 
During the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Club underwent a 
process of progressive institutionalization. The increased administrative needs led 
to the establishment of a permanent Secretariat. Based at the French Treasury, 
which also provides the staff, the Secretariat is granted independence from France, 
but it does not have the power to act independently from member States. 
Today, the Paris Club remains an informal group of creditor countries and its 
functioning is regulated neither by a treaty, nor by any attribution of competences. 
In fact, the Club becoming a proper international organization would have made 
debt restructuring an ordinary operation to be performed at a multilateral level, 
rather than an exceptional event justified only by extreme circumstances. 11 
 
Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Apart from Brazil and the Russian Federation, all the other countries are 
OECD members. 
8 Other creditors that have participated in tour d’horizon meetings (on which see infra) or in 
negotiations with specific debtor countries include: Abu Dhabi, Argentina, China, Kuwait, Mexico, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago and Turkey. Before joining 
the Club, Brazil participated on an ad hoc basis in a number of negotiations related to the debt of 
African countries debt. 
9 The IMF and the IBRD are recognized preferred creditor status (on which see infra par. 4.1) 
by Paris Club members. During Paris Club negotiations, they only have the role of observers. 
10 Since 1978, UNCTAD has been providing its technical assistance to debtor countries taking 
part in debt renegotiations within the Paris Club (see UNCTAD Trade and Development Board 
(TDB) Resolutions 165 (S-IX) and Resolution 222 (XXI). Part B of TDB Resolution 222 (XXI) 
contains the “Detailed Features for Future Operations Relating to the Debt Problems of Interested 
Developing Countries” that applies to bilateral debt only. 
11 A. Rieffel, The Paris Club, 1978-1983, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1984, p. 
84. On the nature of the Paris Club, see among others A. Reinisch, Debt Restructuring and State 




Furthermore, this would have entailed admitting debtor States in the organization, 
something that at the time was not considered desirable by creditors, who feared 
losing power.  
With the number of negotiations soaring during the 1980s, the need for a set of 
codified principles and procedures arose. Since 1982, the Paris Club started to 
convene monthly in tour d’horizon meetings to discuss the overall debt situation of 
developing countries and methodological issues. 
 
2.2 The negotiation process and the Agreed Minutes 
The Paris Club restructuring process is initiated by a debtor State unable to 
service its external debt, which submits a formal request for the opening of 
negotiations to the Secretariat of the Club. 
Negotiations are attended by permanent members (acting as participating 
creditors if they have claims towards the debtor country or otherwise as observers) 
and ad hoc participants.12 In practice, the Club has a variable geometry that depends 
on the State requesting a renegotiation. 
A negotiation meeting begins with a plenary session where the statement of the 
debtor country is presented. This statement is intended to prove a State’s need for 
debt relief and contains data on the balance of payments situation and on debt 
unsustainability, together with economic performance forecasts.  
Data is also presented by the IMF, which provides an assessment of the debtor’s 
economic situation. Notably, the Paris Club will only consider entering negotiations 
if the debtor is pursuing a macroeconomic adjustment programme supported by the 
IMF. 
Once the plenary session is concluded, the debtor country and the observers – 
with the exception of the IMF – are requested to leave the meeting. Creditors gather 
to establish the terms to be offered to the debtor. The proposal has to be agreed 
upon by consensus. The debtor may suggest modifications that are always conveyed 
 
1995, pp. 544 ff. and C. Holmgren, La renégociation multilatérale des dettes: le Club de Paris au 
regard du droit international, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1998, p. 184 ff. 
12 Ad hoc participants share data with permanent members based on reciprocity and fully commit 
to respect the solidarity principle. 
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to the group of creditors by the Chairman of the Paris Club. Commitments on new 
lending are not discussed within the Club. 
The outcome of the negotiations is a document called Agreed Minutes, which is 
signed by the creditors’ representatives, the minister representing the debtor 
country and the Chairman of the Club. The Minutes amount to a gentlemen’s 
agreement, which each government is expected to honour in good faith, but per se 
are not legally binding.13  
The Agreed Minutes, in fact, “are signed ‘ad referendum’ by the heads of the 
participating delegations, who thereby agree to ‘recommend to their 
Governments… that they provide relief… on the following terms’”.14 
To give legal effect to what has been established during the negotiations, the 
terms formalized in the Minutes have to be transposed in bilateral agreements. The 
latter also set the applicable interest rates on the restructured debt. 
There are five principles spelling out the general terms of all Paris Club debt 
treatments: (1) Paris Club decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis to tailor debt 
treatments to each debtor’s specific situation; (2) all decisions are reached by 
consensus among participating creditors (both permanent members and ad hoc 
participants); (3) debt restructuring can be negotiated with the Paris Club only by 
countries clearly in need of debt relief, which are implementing – or committed to 
implement – an IMF programme and its attached conditionality; (4) solidarity is 
requested in the sense that all creditors undertake to implement in good faith the 
terms agreed; and (5) the Paris Club demands comparability of treatment to ensure 
that an equal burden is shared among all external public or private creditors of the 
debtor. 
The latter is a key clause, according to which the debtor country should not 
consent to a treatment on less favourable terms from its external private creditors 
 
13 The Agreed Minutes are signed by the parties involved, but they are not ratified afterwards. 
This shields the common agreement reached within the Paris Club from being the object of debate 
in national parliaments. According to some Authors, the Agreed Minutes can be considered treaties 
concluded by using the simplified procedure. See C. Holmgren, La renégociation multilatérale des 
dettes, cit., pp. 217-230. See also A. Rieffel, The Role of the Paris Club in Managing Debt Problems, 
in Princeton Essays in International Finance, n. 161, December 1985, p. 18; M. Megliani, Sovereign 
Debt: Genesis, Restructuring, Litigation, 2015, Springer, New York, p. 291 and fn. 109. 
14 See L. Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Washington 
DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 91. 
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and other official bilateral creditors.15 In other words, the debtor undertakes to seek 
from creditors that do not belong to the Club a treatment comparable to the one 
granted in the Agreed Minutes. This is understood to apply to States not represented 
in the Club, international organizations and private creditors, the only exception 
being the recognition of preferred creditor status to the IMF, the World Bank and 
multilateral development banks (on this matter see infra paragraph 4.1). 
Breaching the comparability principle would entail the cancellation of Paris 
Club debt relief, thus impairing also the implementation of a country’s IMF 
supported programme and its prospective negotiations with commercial banks or 
bondholders, which might be underway. A “pullback clause” ensures in fact that if 
the debtor agrees better terms with its non-Paris Club bilateral creditors, the 
participating countries will declare the provisions set forth in the Agreed Minutes 
null and void. 
The variety of creditors, however, makes an assessment on comparability of 
treatments complex. This occurs, for example, when the Paris Club grants flow 
treatment while the London Club is restructuring a country’s entire stock of debt, 
or when bondholders are offered a debt swap. 
Moreover, the Paris Club does not acknowledge the validity of the “reverse 
comparability principle”; in fact, public creditors do not feel bound by a haircut 
agreed by the private sector.16 The rationale behind this stance is that, unlike private 
 
15 Lee Buchheit gives an example of a clause: ‘In order to secure comparable treatment of its 
debt due to all its external public or private creditors, the Government of the Republic of Ruritania 
commits to seek promptly from all its external creditors debt reduction and reorganisation 
arrangements on terms comparable in net present value to those set forth in the present Agreed 
Minute for credits of comparable maturity. Comparability of treatment for debt reduction in net 
present value is assessed not only on the basis of the reduction in the face value of the debt but also 
on the terms of repayment of the debts not cancelled. Consequently, the Government of the Republic 
of Ruritania commits to accord all categories of creditors – and in particular creditor countries not 
participating in the present Agreed Minute, commercial banks and suppliers – a treatment not more 
favourable than that accorded to the Participating Creditor Countries’. (L. Buchheit and E. L Daly, 
“Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Carrots”, in R.M. Lastra and L. Buchheit (eds.), Sovereign Debt 
Management, Oxford, 2014, p. 9-10).  
Olivares Caminal gives another example explicitly mentioning bondholders: “In order to secure 
comparable treatment of its debt due to all its external public or private creditors, the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan commits itself to seek from … bond holders the reorganization 
of bonds” (R. Olivares-Caminal, Debt Restructuring, Oxford, OUP, 2011, p. 423). 
16 T. Lambert, “Debt Restructuring Experience: the Paris Club” (2011), p. 4, paper presented at 
the conference “The missing link in the international financial architecture: sovereign debt 
restructuring” organized by Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Argentino, Buenos Aires, 7 
December 2011, available at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/finanzas/deuda%20soberana/lambert.pdf, 
last visited 10 June 2017. 
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creditors, public creditors do not lend for profit purposes. Consequently, an effort 
made by private creditors cannot be a benchmark for the public sector. 
Two types of debt relief treatments17 may be granted by the Paris Club, based on 
the financial situation of the debtor: flow-of-payment and stock-of-debt treatment. 
Flow treatments aim at halting the country’s liquidity problems identified by the 
IMF in its debt sustainability analysis.18 If the IMF determines that the country 
suffers from a temporary liquidity problem, debt payments owed to Paris Club 
creditors and falling due within a given period of time (the consolidation period) 
are rescheduled to help the country close its financing gap.  
If the country is also affected by debt sustainability problems and it lacks the 
long-term resources to meet its debt obligations, it is eligible for the second kind of 
treatment. The concerned stock of debt is rescheduled at concessional terms to 
address the debtor’s solvency problem, thus providing the country with a final “exit 
treatment”. This treatment, however, is only provided in the context of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) and on a case-by-case basis.19 
Before the 1990s, the Paris Club never granted debt cancellation and its 
rescheduling treatments were often insufficient to restore debt sustainability and the 
creditworthiness of the country. 20  On many occasions rescheduling had to be 
repeated more than once. This led the Paris Club to grant longer repayment periods 
(up to 40 years for Official Development Aid loans,21 including a grace period of 
16 years22). 
 
17 The term debt relief is comprehensive of any form of debt treatment that reduces the overall 
burden of debt for a given country, either by refinancing, rescheduling, reduction or conversion. 
18 The flow treatment is usually based on the financing gap identified in the IMF adjustment 
programme and the consolidation period coincides with the period when the IMF arrangement shows 
a need for debt relief. 
19 This treatment was granted for the first time in 1994 under the Naples Terms according to 
which stock treatment could be implemented on a case-by-case basis for countries with a satisfactory 
track record with both the Paris Club and the IMF. 
20 Between 1956 and 1980, rescheduling granted to debtors was at market rates with a repayment 
profile negotiated on a case-by-case basis (usually a ten-year repayment period, which included a 
three-year grace period). 
21 Official Development Aid (ODA) debt is usually restructured on more favourable terms than 
non-ODA debt. The OECD defines ODA as those flows that are “provided by official agencies, 
including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of 
which a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant 
element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).” 




The Paris Club first agreed on a partial reduction of the outstanding debt of least-
developed countries in 1988.23 Since then, debt reduction has been increasingly 
resorted to, raising the level of cancellation to up to 90 per cent in the framework 
of the HIPC Initiative. By introducing new terms of treatment, the Paris Club turned 
in the last 60 years from a mere debt collector into a provider of sequential debt 
relief, thus incorporating a development assistance element among the objectives 
of its activities. 24  
Paris Club creditors have often agreed to offer a pre-defined treatment to specific 
categories of debtor countries. The current Paris Club standard treatments, ranking 
in degree of concessionality, are: Classic Terms, the standard terms available to any 
country eligible for Paris Club relief; Houston Terms,25 for highly-indebted low to 
mid-income countries; Naples Terms, for highly-indebted poor countries; Cologne 
Terms, for countries eligible for the HIPC Initiative.  
Classic and Houston terms only offer debt rescheduling, while Naples and 
Cologne terms provide also for debt reduction. 
The Paris Club also offers creditors the possibility to voluntarily engage in debt 
swaps and to buy back their debt ahead of schedule (the same conditions should be 
offered to all Paris Club creditors which, however, are free to individually decide 
whether to take part in the operation). 
In order to be eligible for the restructuring, loans must have been taken before a 
cut-off date, which is usually established the first time a debtor meets with the Paris 
Club. Short-term debts, falling due within a year, are not treated by the Club.  
Having been temporarily relieved from the payment of loans taken prior to the 
cut-off date, the debtor is given the possibility of restoring its creditworthiness and 
regaining access to new credit.  
 
23 Under the so-called Toronto terms, between 1988 and 1991, 20 countries obtained a 33.33 per 
cent cancellation of their non-ODA debts. 
24  See also Gong Cheng, Javier Diaz-Cassou, Aitor Erce, From Debt Collection to Relief 
Provision: 60 Years of Official Debt Restructurings through the Paris Club, ESM Working Paper 
Series 20, 2016. 
25 Most of the denominations of the standard Paris Club terms come from the G7/G8 meetings 
in which they were agreed upon. 
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Loans granted after the cut-off date can be renegotiated with the Paris Club only 
on an exceptional basis, when it is demonstrated that debt relief was not sufficient 
to restore the payment capacity of the country. 
 
2.3 Is the Paris Club at the end of its cycle? Life after the HIPC and the Evian 
approach 
At the end of the 1990s, the Paris Club resolved on the adoption of two different 
approaches, tracing a distinction between HIPC and non-HIPC countries.  
The HIPC Initiative was launched by the IMF and the World Bank in 1996 (and 
enhanced in 1999), when the seriousness of the external debt situation of a large 
number of low-income countries was finally understood. The initiative called for a 
coordinated action by the IMF, the IDA and other multilateral institutions, together 
with official bilateral creditors and commercial creditors.26 The aim was to bring 
the debt of HIPC countries down to sustainable levels, channelling the freed 
resources towards poverty reduction priorities.27 
To be eligible for the HIPC Initiative, a country had to be burdened by an 
unsustainable debt situation even after the application of the traditional debt relief 
mechanisms (like a preliminary flow treatment granted by the Paris Club under the 
Naples Terms28). Furthermore, the country had to be eligible for borrowing under 
highly concessional terms from the IDA and the IMF, and it had to implement a 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). 
Decision Point was reached when a country still suffered from unsustainable 
debt, despite satisfactorily implementing its IMF/IDA-supported programme. At 
decision point, the IMF/IDA Executive Boards formally decided whether a country 
 
26 Non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors and commercial creditors, however, delivered only 
a small share of their expected debt relief. 
27 It is interesting to note that the HIPC Initiative was designed to preserve the preferred creditor 
status of the IFIs, without exempting them from taking part in debt relief operations. Despite the 
common understanding, under the HIPC Initiative, IFIs are still repaid, only not by the debtors, but 
by drawing on special funds largely raised from the major creditor countries: for instance, the IMF’s 
costs of HIPC debt relief were financed by bilateral contributions and the investment income on the 
proceeds from off-market gold sales in 1999. 
28 Under the Naples terms, 67 per cent of eligible non-ODA credits are cancelled, the remaining 
amounts are rescheduled over 23 years with a 6-year grace period. ODA credits are rescheduled 
over 40 years with a 16-year grace period. 
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qualified for debt relief and determined its extent. The Paris Club usually granted 
interim relief under Cologne terms (flow treatment).29 
Completion Point was reached once the country had achieved macroeconomic 
stability under a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility supported programme and 
it had carried out structural and social reforms, successfully implementing a PRS 
for at least one year. At completion point, the country “graduated” from the HIPC 
Initiative, receiving the assistance still necessary to reach debt sustainability. The 
Paris Club granted stock treatment on the condition that the other creditors provided 
comparable treatment. 
In 2005, to help accelerate progress towards the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), the HIPC Initiative was supplemented by the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). The MDRI allowed for 100 per cent 
cancellation of the eligible debts by the IMF, the IDA, the African Development 
Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank for those countries having reached 
completion point under the HIPC Initiative.30 
Through the HIPC and MDRI initiatives, between 2000 and 2014 the 
international financial community cancelled debts with a total face value of 
USD126 billion.31 Paris Club creditors accounted for approximately a quarter of the 
total financial effort. On average, external public debt was reduced from 119% of 
GDP in the year prior to the decision point to 33% of GDP two years after the 
completion point.32 
At the end of 2017, out of the 39 countries eligible to receive debt relief under 
the HIPC Initiative, 36 countries reached the completion point, receiving stock of 
debt treatment by Paris Club creditors. The remaining 3 countries which were 
identified as potentially eligible for assistance – Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan – have 
not reached the decision point yet.  
 
29  Under the Cologne terms, non-ODA credits are cancelled up to 90 per cent or more if 
necessary. The remaining amounts are rescheduled over 23 years with a 6-year grace period. ODA 
credits are rescheduled over 40 years with a 16-year grace period. 
30 On the HIPC and MDRI initiatives see, among others, T. A. Duvall III, “Debt Relief for Low-
Income Countries”, in R.M. Lastra and L. Buchheit (eds.), Sovereign Debt Management, Oxford, 
2014, p. 69-84. 
31 See IMF, "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative - 
Statistical Update", 2014. 
32 Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2015. 
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For what concerns the debt problems of non-HIPC countries, in 2003 the Paris 
Club adopted the so-called Evian Approach, shifting from the provision of short-
term debt relief to a long-term debt sustainability approach.  
Through the Evian approach, the Paris Club extensively relies on debt 
sustainability tools to adapt its response to the financial situation of the debtor 
countries. However, while formally acknowledging that even non-HIPC countries 
may face solvency problems, no new terms of treatment have been applied and the 
Paris Club continues using a combination of standard terms adapted to each 
debtor’s financial situations. A comprehensive debt treatment (flow treatment, 
stock reprofiling, stock reduction) is offered to non-HIPC countries only if they 
establish a satisfactory track record in implementing an IMF programme and in 
reimbursing Paris Club creditors. Debt reduction, either through principal or NPV 
reduction, is provided only in exceptional cases. Between 2009-2015, Paris Club 
concluded five agreements under the Evian Approach.33 
Certainly, the Paris Club has played a crucial role in the restructuring of official 
debt, reaching since its establishment 433 agreements with 90 different countries.34 
By freeing resources for poverty reduction, it certainly contributed to the 
improvement of the socio-economic situation of developing countries.  
However, since the 1990s, the Club’s share of developing countries’ debt and 
financing flows has been steadily declining and, currently, a significant number of 
countries (even post-HIPC countries) are accumulating new debt at a rapid pace 
and are at risk of returning to unsustainable debt levels. 
In fact, after the 2008 financial crisis, several middle- and low-income countries 
have turned to international bond markets to finance their development needs. 
Many are first-time issuer of sovereign bonds (among HIPC countries: Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia). 35  The risks they incur are 
heightened by the fact that their sovereign bonds are usually denominated in foreign 
currency and their terms do not include the latest boilerplate provisions promoted 
 
33 See Paris Club, Annual Report 2016, p. 9. 
34 In the period 1950-2010, “the number of official debt restructurings by the Paris Club far 
exceeds the number of private debt restructurings with commercial banks or bondholders, with 
nearly double as many deals” (U. Das, M. Papaioannou, C. Trebesch, op. cit., p. 33).  
35 See A. Guscina, G. Pedras and G. Presciuttini, “First-Time International Bond Issuance - New 
Opportunities and Emerging Risks” (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/127. 
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by the IMF and the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) to counter 
vulture funds’ strategies.36  
Moreover, an increasing share of official bilateral financing is provided by new 
lenders – like China, India, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – which are not permanent 
members of the Paris Club, nor do they seem interested in joining it. This situation 
might give rise to creditor coordination problems and eventually to holdout 
behaviours among official creditors. 
In contrast to traditional lenders, new lenders tend not to assess the long-term 
sustainability of the borrower’s debt and apply a non-interference policy, showing 
a strong preference for lending without conditionality.37 Besides, they offer loans 
to developing countries “with non-traditional financial structures (including 
implicit or explicit collateralization, foreign exchange clauses, and variable 
fees)”.38 
Moreover, data shows that, in recent years, the application of the comparable 
treatment principle by non-Paris Club creditors has fallen short of expectations. 
New lenders provided “less than half of the total debt relief expected”39 to HIPC-
countries and a similar behaviour was observed with regard to non-HIPC countries. 
A broader inclusion of emerging creditors is therefore essential for the Paris Club 
to preserve its role as “the principal international forum for restructuring official 
bilateral debt”.40 To this end, Korea’s and Brazil’s accession to the Club as well as 
China’s regular participation in tour d’horizon meetings since 2014 (even if on an 
ad hoc basis) are noticeable. 
 
36 Source: N. Bertin, “Economic risks and rewards for first-time sovereign bond issuers since 
2007”, Trésor-Economics, N. 186, November 2016. The typical bond of first-time issuers is a USD 
denominated bond governed by English law and issued on the New York market. Most are “bullet 
bonds”: the entire principal is repaid all at once at maturity date.  
37  See N. Nkunde Mwase and Y. Yang (2012), “BRICs’ Philosophies for Development 
Financing and Their Implications for LICs” (2012) IMF Working Paper, IMF WP/12/74, p. 3. 
38 IMF, “Applying the Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries Post Debt 
Relief”, November 2006, p. 8. Little is known about the terms of this new lending. 
39 IMF, “Reforming the Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official Creditors”, IMF 
Policy Paper, December 2015, p. 12. 
40 As recognized in 2016 by the G20 (see G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
Communiqué, Chengdu, China, 24 July 2016, par. 8 and G20 Leaders’ Communiqué, Hangzou 
Summit, 5 September 2016, par. 17). 
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To avoid seeing debt relief efforts undermined by free riding, the Paris Club 
should build a framework for an enhanced dialogue with emerging creditors with a 
view to ensure information sharing, coordination and comparable treatment.41  
To this end, since October 2013, the G20 and the Paris Club have been hosting 
on an annual basis the Paris Forum to discuss emerging trends and challenges in 
official financing and to promote inclusiveness and dialogue between sovereign 
debtors and creditors.42 It is in this context that, for instance, the G20 Operational 
Guidelines for Sustainable Financing were first discussed.43 
Initiatives have been taken also within the IMF, in particular in relation to the 
Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of arrears to official bilateral creditors (NTP), 
which long relied on the Paris Club practices and processes.  
The NTP policy prevents the IMF from lending to countries if they owe 
unresolved arrears to official bilateral creditors, unless the arrears are covered by a 
Paris Club agreement or each creditor consents to the Fund financing. When there 
is a formal Paris Club Agreed Minute, also arrears to non-Paris Club countries are 
deemed resolved because the Fund relies on the observance of the Club’s 
comparability of treatment principle.  
In 2015, in the light of the increasingly important role played by new official 
bilateral lenders and of recent difficulties in ensuring their comparable participation 
 
41  See IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Recent Developments and Implications for the 
Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework”, April 2013, p. 34. See also H. Reisen and S. Ndoye, “Prudent 
versus Imprudent Lending to Africa: From Debt Relief to Emerging Lenders” (2008) OECD 
Development Centre Working Paper No. 268. 
42 The 5th annual conference of the Paris Forum gathered in Paris in November 2017 the Paris 
Club’s 22 permanent members, G20 members which are ad hoc participants in the Club (in 2017 
only China, but in 2016 also South Africa attended), G20 members not participating in the Club 
(Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico and Saudi Arabia), other members of the European Union (Czech 
Republic and Poland) and developing countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, The Gambia, Jordan, Niger, Senegal, Sri 
Lanka and Vietnam). The IMF, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the UNCTAD, the OECD, the European Commission, the ECB and 
representatives of NGOs and of the civil society also participated in the Conference. 
In December 2017, the Paris Forum held its first regional conference for Southern Africa in 
Namibia. 
43 The G20 Operational guidelines for sustainable financing adopted at Baden Baden on the 17th 
of March 2017 are available at 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Schlaglichter/G20-
2016/g20-operational-guidelines-for-sustainable-financing.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, last 
visited 10 January 2018. The G20 however failed to mention the significant body of work recently 
undertaken by the UN General Assembly and by the UNCTAD on the issue. 
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to the provision of debt relief, the Fund considered a reform of the NTP policy 
necessary. 
According to the new policy, 1) where the majority of the arrears are owed to 
non-Paris Club countries and the latter is therefore not adequately representative of 
the creditor base or 2) where the creditors are not members of the Club and an 
agreement cannot be reached bilaterally or under alternative groupings, the Fund 
will lend into arrears only if it satisfies itself that the debtor is making good faith 
efforts to reach a debt restructuring agreement and that its absence is due to the 
unwillingness of the creditor.44 
While the IMF policy is still primarily centred on the Paris Club process, it is 
acknowledged that in the future a new representative forum for the official sector 
involvement may emerge. In the meanwhile, the Fund continues to encourage new 
lenders “to participate in the Paris Club negotiations on an ad hoc basis”.45 
As a last remark, it is worth noting that every year the Paris Club and the Institute 
of International Finance46  (IIF) jointly organize a meeting among official and 
private creditors, with the IMF and the World Bank also attending.47  
 
3. The London Club (or the Bank Advisory Committee) process 
3.1 Origins and nature of the London Club process 
In the 1970s, developing countries borrowed heavily from commercial banks, 
mainly in the form of syndicated loans. Debt owed by a government to commercial 
banks was restructured through bank advisory committees. The first instances in 
which this form of debt restructuring was adopted were the negotiations with Zaire, 
Peru, Turkey, Sudan48 and Poland in the period between 1976 and 1981.49 
 
44 See IMF, “Reforming the Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official Creditors”, 
cit., p. 15-16. 
45 Ibid. 
46 The IIF is a global association of financial institutions. Its members include most of the world’s 
largest commercial banks and investment banks, as well as a growing number of insurance 
companies, investment management firms, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth funds. 
47 The last meeting of Paris Club and the IIF with representatives of the private sector took place 
in Paris on 21 June 2017. 
48 It is worth noting that in January 2017 a group of commercial creditors formed the Sudan 
London Club to start negotiations with the country. To our knowledge this is the most recently 
established BAC.  
49 See L. Rieffel (1984), op. cit., p. 102 ff. 
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 The process was replicated in subsequent defaults and it was labelled “London 
Club” in a somehow misleading way, since the negotiations were not always 
conducted in the City, but also in Paris and New York.50 The term is used to refer 
to meetings held between commercial creditors and a debtor State by establishing 
an ad hoc Bank Advisory Committee, a Steering Committee or a Creditor 
Committee.  
Bank Advisory Committees (BAC) were defined as “a communications link 
between the sovereign borrower and the international banking community”.51 They 
are typically composed of 10 to 20 senior representatives of the banks with the 
largest credit exposures to the debtor country. Members of the committee negotiate 
only on behalf of the banks participating in the syndicate: they do not represent 
other banks or other categories of creditors. 
The London Club process is even less institutionalized than the Paris Club: not 
only is it not established by a treaty, but there are no Secretariat or fixed venues, 
and the costs of its meetings are usually borne by the debtor. 
Moreover, unlike the Paris Club, there are no permanent members and the 
composition of a BAC changes greatly according to the debtor. 
 
3.2 The restructuring of sovereign debt owed to commercial banks 
The debt restructuring process is usually triggered by a country’s default and its 
subsequent incapacity to borrow on international capital markets. 
The BAC is voluntarily established by the country, which mandates one of its 
largest creditors to arrange a committee. When the debt is in the form of a 
syndicated loan, like in the 1980s, the arranger of the loan usually chairs the 
committee. Together with the chief negotiator for the debtor country, the 
chairperson invites other leading banks to participate. The composition of the 
creditor committee and the appointment of its chair are very sensitive issues, but 
 
50 The first mentioned renegotiations took place in London, but during the 1980s-1990s a large 
number of negotiations with Latin American countries took place in New York. Occasionally, 
creditor committees also met in Paris. 
51 L. C. Buchheit, “Advisory Committees: What’s in a Name?” (1991) 10 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 9, p. 
9. See also M. Megliani, cit., p. 331 ff. 
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the advantage of a lean process is that the debtor is provided a single negotiation 
lane.  
It has to be underlined that BACs do not operate under any formal set of rules or 
procedures and their formation is “without legal recognition, either as a matter of 
contract or as a matter of law”. 52  Moreover, the formation of a BAC has no 
consequence on the contractual relationships between the debtor and its creditors. 
In fact, a debtor request for a debt standstill is unusual and typically there is no 
“cooling off period” during which payments would be temporarily suspended or 
deferred and creditors would be prevented from initiating litigation.  
Although the course of action derives from practice, there is less reliance on 
precedents than in the context of the Paris Club. A BAC is typically mandated to: 
(1) adopt the procedures it considers most appropriate; (2) verify the financial data 
presented by the debtor to support its request for a restructuring or for new lending; 
(3) perform a recognition survey on the various categories and amounts of the 
outstanding debt; (4) assess the adequacy of the country’s adjustment plans and 
reform efforts; (5) negotiate the terms of the restructuring, which may also include 
new financing; (6) draft all the legal documentation; (7) sign a confidentiality 
agreement; (8) endorse the final outcome of the negotiations and promote its 
acceptance among non-committee creditors to achieve critical mass.53  
At the first meeting, the debtor’s chief negotiator submits to the BAC an 
economic programme and a restructuring proposal. The country’s Minister of 
Finance or the Governor of the central bank usually attends the meeting. 
BAC members meet separately to prepare a counteroffer. Unlike Paris Club 
members, they are not bound by foreign policy objectives and restructurings are 
always market oriented, the goal being to limit losses. 
As for conditionality, a country is usually requested to pay interest arrears and 
might be induced to enter an IMF-supported programme before the conclusion of 
the negotiations.  
 
52 On this point see A. Mudge, “Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspective of Counsel to Agent 
Banks, Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks” (1984-1985) 23 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 59, p. 
64. 
53 In practice, when the package is finalized by the BAC and the debtor country, the available 
choices for creditor banks not taking part in the committee are only to sign or not to sign the deal. 
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An economic subcommittee is appointed to collect and study the data presented 
by the debtor, as well as that provided by the banks and the IMF, in order to 
independently assess the country’s debt sustainability. A legal subcommittee is 
established to draw up all the documentation. 
At the end of the process, the BAC and the debtor sign the “term sheet” – also 
called “heads of terms” or “agreement in principle” – which is submitted to all the 
members of the syndicate for approval.  
For the agreement to become valid, unanimity is usually required, or acceptance 
by banks holding at least 95 per cent of the outstanding debt. Usually, each material 
element of a restructuring package has to be agreed upon by the members of the 
BAC.  
Unanimity was generally easy to achieve during the debt crisis of the 1980s, but 
in the following decade – together with other technical and legal issues – it caused 
lengthy negotiations that in the case of Russia, for instance, lasted three years 
(1998-2000). 
Unlike the Agreed Minutes of the Paris Club, the agreement reached at the end 
of the BAC process, once formally ratified, is final and legally binding upon all the 
members.54  
The agreement designates a servicing bank to receive payments from the debtor 
and to distribute them to the participating creditors.  
BACs have often addressed both the liquidity and solvency problems of 
sovereigns in distress. 55  There are no standard terms of treatment and every 
workout is tailored on the specificities of the individual debtor country and on the 
structure of its debt. In fact, within the London Club process, “the full spectrum of 
crisis resolution measures is negotiable, including the provision of new financing, 
short-term liquidity support via rollovers or credit lines, as well as the restructuring 
of loans with maturity prolongation and/or outright reductions in face value”.56  
 
54  In a few cases, “major creditors also refused to participate in agreements arranged by a 
representative group (e.g., Bankers Trust in Algeria in 1992, Lloyds bank in Argentina in 1982, 
Citibank in Chile in 1987 and in the Philippines in 1986)” (U. Das, M. Papaioannou, C. Trebesch, 
cit., p. 17). 
55 In the early 1990s, stock-of-debt treatments and debt reductions were agreed by BACs to 
middle-income countries despite the Paris Club’s refusal to do the same. 
56 U. Das, M. Papaioannou, C. Trebesch, cit., p. 17. 
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Typically, the deal provides for a deferral of the payments terms of the debt 
falling due within a specific period of time and sets a single (adjustable) interest 
rate to all of the restructured debt.57 
During the restructuring process new loans may be granted, subject to the 
approval by a supermajority of the holders of the outstanding debt. Creditors not 
agreeing, however, refused in some occasions to offer new loans alongside the 
majority.58 This was the main cause of disagreement between participating banks 
during the Latin American debt crisis: large commercial banks in the United States 
were willing to provide new loans to their debtors, with the goal of avoiding defaults 
and continuing doing business, while smaller banks were less interested in granting 
bridge loans to countries in distress.59 
In the 1980s, BACs usually agreed to let debtor countries stay current on their 
obligations to bondholders, thus not requesting comparability of treatment.60 
 
3.3 From the London Club process to bondholders’ committees 
Until the end of the 1980s, most sovereign debt was in the form of bank loans 
and the London Club was the leading process for the restructuring of sovereign debt 
towards commercial banks. In the following decade, however, the return of bonds 
as the predominant form of sovereign borrowing signalled a change. 
Nowadays, instead of a small group of commercial banks, sovereigns in distress 
face tens of thousands of diverse and unknown bondholders which include banks 
and institutional investors as well as retail investors. Restructurings have taken the 
form of sovereign bond exchanges. 
 
57 Interest on rescheduled commercial bank debt is set at market rate with reference to LIBOR. 
Any rate below LIBOR is considered concessional in nature and therefore inconsistent with 
commercial practices. 
58 In this case “The pari passu clause provided assurance that large creditor institutions, which 
were negotiating these agreements [i.e. new loans] and often had differing motivations because of 
their physical presence in the borrowing country, would not receive an unfair advantage in debt 
repayment over the smaller banks that lacked such negotiating leverage” (H. Tether, “Courts Are 
Right to Hold Argentina to Equal Debt Treatment”, New York Times, 18 January 2013). 
59 See I. Wong, Sovereign Finance and the Poverty of Nations: Odious Debt in International 
Law, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, p. 45-46. 
60 L. Rieffel (1984), cit., p. 110. 
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With the diffusion of collective action clauses (CACs),61 some academics and 
government officials 62  recommended that sovereign bond contracts included a 
representation clause envisioning a single committee, either for the coordination of 
creditors of a specific bond issue or of all bondholders of a State.63 
In 2002, the G-10 Working Group on CACs “considered the need to promote a 
collaborative sovereign restructuring process by providing a mechanism for the 
election of a special bondholder representative, empowered to engage in 
restructuring discussions with the debtor without undue delay”.64 Any amendment 
to the terms of the contract, however, would have to be approved by the 
bondholders themselves. Moreover, the mandate of the bondholders’ representative 
was limited to the coordination of creditors within a single bond issue.  
Similar initiatives followed. In the aftermath of the Argentina’s debt crisis, in 
fact, market actors proved ready to consent to the establishment of different codes 
of conduct to counter proposals on a statutory regime for sovereign debt 
restructuring.  
In 2004, the International Primary Market Association (IPMA) adopted standard 
CACs for fiscal agency agreements under English law that recommended the 
appointment of a single “Noteholders’ Committee”. In 2015, the International 
Capital Markets Association (ICMA) updated said provisions.65 The new clauses 
 
61 On CACs see Chapter xxx by Giuseppe Bianco. Among others, see S. Häseler, “Collective 
Action Clauses in Sovereign Bonds”, in Kolb, R.W. (ed.), Sovereign Debt: from Safety to Default, 
Hoboken, NJ, Wiley, 2011, pp. 235-243 
62 See A. Gelpern and M. Gulati, “Innovation After the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond 
Contracts Since 2003” (2009) Capital Markets Law Journal, vol. 4, n. 1, pp. 85-103, at 94. 
Reference is made in particular to: John B. Taylor (US Under Secretary of Treasury for International 
Affairs), “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A US Perspective”, speech at the conference “Sovereign 
Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards”, Institute for International Economics, 2 April 2002, as well 
as to the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism proposal of 2003. According to the SDRM 
proposal – which was mainly designed for bondholder debt –, a representative creditor committee 
would be given the role to address both debtor-creditor and inter-creditor issues (see IMF, “Proposed 
Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism”, 12 February 2003, p. 25). See also L. C. 
Buchheit and M. Gulati, “Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will” (2003) 51 Emory L J 1317. 
63  In the latter case, challenges similar to those related to the aggregation of bonds across 
different issues for voting purposes arise. 
64 Group of Ten, “Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses, 26 September 
2002, p. 3. 
65 In July 2005, IPMA merged with the International Securities Market Association (ISMA) to 
form the International Capital Market Association (ICMA). See ICMA, “Standard Aggregated 
Collective Action Clauses for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes Governed by English 
Law – Meeting of Noteholders; Written Resolutions”, May 2015, available at 
http://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information, last visited 7 January 2018. 
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“allow the aggregation of debt across multiple series of debt securities to meet the 
requisite threshold to form a committee, and, in instances where multiple creditor 
committees are formed, require that a simple steering committee interfaces directly 
with the debtor”.66 
Early negotiations with a creditor committee in cases of default on debt owed to 
private creditors and investors are also supported by the IIF in its Principles for 
Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring.67 According to the Principles, if 
a creditor committee is appointed, it should adopt its own rules and procedures, 
coordinate across affected instruments and with other affected creditor classes, with 
a view to form a single committee to act as a communication link between the 
debtor and the creditor community. A high level of confidentiality by committee 
members, especially on sensitive business information, is prescribed. 
In addition, the IIF Best Practices for Formation and Operation of Creditor 
Committees68 contain indications on the initial formation of the committee, on its 
representativeness and diversity, on its members’ required expertise as well as on 
confidentiality and costs. 
After their last amendment of 2017, the IIF Best Practices recommends the use 
of creditor committees not only when a country defaults on its private external debt, 
but also in pre-default cases where a restructuring or reprofiling is needed. 69 
Besides, references to aggregated CACs have been added. 
 
66  IIF, “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring: Report on 
Implementation”, October 2017, p. 53. 
67 The IIF Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring (in Emerging Markets) 
were adopted in 2004 and revised in 2010. They adapt the established practices of traditional bank 
advisory committees to the world of capital markets. In 2012, the IIF Group of Trustees endorsed 
an Addendum to the Principles to take into account recent experiences with sovereign debt crises, 
in particular the Greek one.  
On the IIF Principles see A. Gelpern, “Hard, Soft, and Embedded: Implementing Principles on 
Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing”, in C. Esposito, Yuefen Li, J.P. 
Bohoslavsky, Sovereign Financing and International Law: The UNCTAD Principles on Promoting 
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing (Oxford, OUP, 2013), pp. 374-376.  
It is worth noting that, on the contrary, the 2012 UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible 
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing do not advocate for the formation of creditor committees, but 
only for a prompt, efficient and fair debt restructuring (Principle n. 15). 
68 The IIF Best Practices for Formation and Operation of Creditor Committees were adopted in 
2007 and last updated in 2017. For the text of the Best Practices, see IIF, “Principles for Stable 
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring: Report on Implementation”, Annex VI, October 2017, 
p. 49, available at www.iif.com. 
69  See IIF, “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring: Report on 
Implementation”, October 2017, p. 14. 
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Despite being supported by many, there is still no consensus on the benefits of 
creditor committees. In recent years, debtors expressed their preference for bilateral 
negotiations or no negotiations at all; questioned creditor committees’ 
representativeness; decided not to be involved in a creditor committee whose 
members had competing interests or were not considered able to keep 
confidentiality; were reluctant to serve on a creditor committee “if the price of doing 
so is an undertaking to retain their exposure until the end of the restructuring 
process”;70 considered the entire process costly and time-consuming; were unable 
to join a creditor committee because they did not have the proper corporate structure 
or because unable to pay the costs.71 
As recently as April 2013, the IMF too questioned the representativeness of 
creditor committees while reviewing its policy on lending into arrears (LIA).72 
Despite encouraging debtor countries to engage in a collaborative process with their 
creditors and provide them with an early opportunity to give input on the design of 
the restructuring strategies and instruments,73  the Fund expressed doubts as to 
creditor committees’ ability effectively to represent the wide diversity of interests 
at stake, due to the increased complexity of the creditor base.74 
In fact, “over the years, creditors have increased in number and become more 
dispersed, while having different accounting rules (e.g., book value versus mark-
to-market) and holding patterns and incentives (e.g., short-term creditors versus 
 
70 L. C. Buchheit (2009), op. cit., p. 212. 
71 For a discussion on potential drawbacks or benefits of establishing creditor committees see L. 
C. Buchheit, “Use of Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Workouts” (2009) 10 (3) Business 
Law International, p. 208 and T.B. De Sieno, “Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring: Understanding the Benefits and Addressing Concerns”, in M. Guzman, J.A. Ocampo, 
J.E. Stiglitz (eds.), Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises, New York, 
2016, pp. 175-186. 
72 Under the LIA policy, the Fund may lend to a member despite its arrears to external private 
creditors only under certain conditions: most notably, only when 1) Fund’s support is considered 
essential for the successful implementation of the member’s adjustment program, and 2) when the 
member is pursuing appropriate policies and is making a “good faith effort” to reach a collaborative 
agreement with its private creditors. The good faith criterion was interpreted to include a sovereign’s 
good faith efforts to enter into negotiations with a sufficiently representative creditor committee 
formed in a timely manner in circumstances where this organized negotiating framework is justified 
by the complexity of the case. See also IMF, “Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private 
Creditors – Further Consideration on the Good Faith Criterion”, July 2002, p. 15 ff. 
73 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s 
Legal and Policy Framework” (2013), cit., p. 40. 
74 Ivi, p. 36. For instance, the interests of investors who purchased credit default swaps or other 




those holding to maturity), especially when creditors enter the debt market at 
different prices”.75 
In practice, even if creditor committees might help build inter-creditor consensus, 
thus minimizing holdout problems, they have rarely been formed. On the basis of 
available data, since 2000, creditor committees were established only in the 
following cases: Argentina (2004), the Dominican Republic (2005), Grenada (2005 
and 2013), Belize (2007, 2012 and 2017), the Seychelles (2008), St. Kitts and Nevis 
(2012) and Greece (2011).76 
In the case of Argentina, the government refused any formal contact with the 
Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders, which spontaneously formed in 2004 
and claimed to represent approximately 75 per cent of Argentine bonds held 
abroad77. In the case of Grenada and Belize, although more than 50 per cent of the 
outstanding bonds were represented in creditor committees, these were composed 
of just few major financial institutions. For the Dominican Republic, the Seychelles 
and the St. Kitts and Nevis committees, creditor representation was limited.  
The Greek sovereign debt crisis was peculiar in many instances. Not only was it 
the first pre-default debt restructuring in a developed economy in decades, but it 
also introduced many novelties in the way the restructuring was managed. It is 
interesting to note that, during 2012, informal discussions78 on the so-called private 
sector involvement agreement (PSI) were conducted by a Steering Committee made 
up of 13 major private creditors, acting on behalf of a larger group of 32 creditors 
 
75 IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring” (2013), op. cit., p. 36. 
76 The dates in brackets indicate the formation of each committee. Information on the listed 
creditor committees can be found in U. Das, M. Papaioannou, C. Trebesch, cit., pp. 24-25. see also 
IMF, “Belize Staff Report for the 2013 Art. IV Consultation”, 5 June 2013, p. 33; BroadSpan Capital 
Press Release, “Grenada Steering Committee and Ad-Hoc Committee Announce Formation”, New 
York, 3 May 2013; T. Asonouma et al., “Sovereign Debt Restructurings in Belize”, IMF Working 
Paper, WP/14/132, July 2014; T. Asonouma et al., “Sovereign Debt Restructurings in Grenada”, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/17/171, July 2017. 
On committees established before World War I, when bonds were still the predominant form of 
sovereign borrowing, see supra footnote 3. 
77 The Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders consisted of the Task Force Argentina, the 
Argentina Bondholders Committee, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Shinsei Bank. Institutional and 
retail investors were represented in the General Membership category. Deutsche Bank, DZ Bank, 
the Swiss Bankers Association and the Argentine Bond Restructuring Agency participated as 
observers. 
78 As recognized by the Greek Council of State in its Judgment No. 1116/2014 on the legality of 
the sovereign debt restructuring, discussions with the PCIC “were absolutely informal and no 
binding commitment for any investor has come out of them”. 
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forming the Private Creditor-Investor Committee (PCIC). The Steering Committee 
and the PCIC represented the main categories of debt holders: financial institutions, 
banks, insurance companies and asset managers, many of which were also members 
of the IIF. The Greek Steering Committee was co-chaired by two senior IIF officials 
and undoubtedly it was the most important bondholders’ committee to be 
established since the 19th Century.79 In the case of Greece, the IIF demonstrated to 
be extremely active in promoting adherence to its Principles, which more recently 
also served as a framework for the negotiations with Belize. 
At this point of our analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
(1) Bondholders’ committees, modelled on the London Club process, might be 
a useful vehicle for negotiations: they can streamline the restructuring process and 
build inter-creditor consensus, redress information imbalances and, above all, 
minimize holdout creditor behaviour.80 
(2) Most of them are self-appointed, their bargaining power entirely depending 
on their credibility and on acknowledgement and acceptance by both the sovereign 
debtor and bondholders. Even if the bond contract does not provide for the 
establishment of a committee, nothing prohibits bondholders to spontaneously form 
one. In the case of Belize, the initiative was taken by the government, which 
announced that it was prepared “to recognize and deal with a formal creditors’ 
committee on the terms set out in a memorandum captioned ‘Belizean Creditors’ 
Committee’”.81 
(3) Creditor committees adopt at their discretion the rules they consider more 
appropriate for their proceedings. In fact, important aspects of creditor committees’ 
operations have yet to be clarified through the adoption of best practices or a code 
of conduct dealing with their formation and representativeness, with confidentiality 
 
79 See IIF, “Report of the Joint Committee on Strengthening the Framework for Sovereign Debt 
Crisis Prevention and Resolution”, October 2012, p. 12-13 and p. 52; J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch, 
and M. Gulati, “The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy”, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics Working Paper, WP 13-8, August 2013, p. 9; P. R. Wood, “How the Greek Debt 
Reorganisation of 2012 Changed the Rules of Sovereign Insolvency” (2013) Business Law 
International, vol. 14, n. 1, p. 11-12. 
80 On these points see T.B. De Sieno (2016), cit., p. 176-178. 
81 See L. C. Buchheit (2009), op. cit., p. 213 ff. 
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and expenses as well as with other important features such as standstills on litigation 
or a moratorium on the trading of bonds.82 
It is noteworthy that Belize and its bondholders’ committee agreed on a 30-day 
moratorium on the trading of bonds, together with a confidentiality agreement.83 
(4) In recent times, the unanimity rule has not been applied. In the case of Belize, 
for instance, 75 per cent of the total amount of debt held by all committee members 
was sufficient for the adoption of decisions. This qualified majority rule is in line 
with the rationale behind CACs. 
(5) In most of the cases, the outcome of the negotiations was an exchange offer 
formally put forward by the debtor State and endorsed by the creditor committee, 
that needed acceptance by a critical mass of creditors to become binding. 
Remarkably, the Greek debt restructuring was a hybrid between a creditor 
committee process and a unilateral take-it-or-leave-it exchange offer.84 In 2017, 
since the bonds to be restructured included a collective action clause, Belize used a 
consent solicitation instead of an exchange offer. 
The next paragraphs will be devoted to analysing how recent developments and 
the wide diversity of sovereign bondholders are going to affect the role of the Paris 
and London Clubs as the “leading” vehicles for sovereign debt restructuring. 
 
4. Recent Developments in the Identity of Bond Investors: The Issue of 
Supranational Creditors 
To better assess what role is left to the Paris and London Clubs, it is essential to 
have a clear picture of how the identity of sovereign creditors has changed over 
time, shifting from homogeneous groups with similar standing to a composite 
landscape of different actors. 
Currently, sovereign bondholders consist of a heterogeneous group of investors, 
ranging from individuals to commercial banks, including institutional investors and 
public-sector entities. Bondholders have become increasingly diverse, numerous, 
anonymous and difficult to coordinate. To further complicate a common course of 
 
82 On these points see T.B. De Sieno (2016), cit., p. 180 ff. 
83  Institute of International Finance, “Report of the Joint Committee on Strengthening the 
Framework for Sovereign Debt Crisis Prevention and Resolution”, October 2013, p. 11. 
84 On which see infra paragraph 4.2. 
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action, they might have conflicting interests, different incentives and bargaining 
power, different accounting rules and holding patterns as well as significant 
information asymmetries.  
The challenges posed by the fragmentation of bondholders are particularly 
pronounced when it comes to “supranational creditors”. This term is here used to 
describe international organizations (the IMF and the IBRD) and supranational 
institutions (like the ECB and the EIB) when they purchase sovereign bonds on the 
secondary market. Supranational bondholders are halfway between private 
investors pursuing pure economic interests and multilaterals pursuing their public-
sector objectives. 
It is a consolidated practice for some international organizations (IOs) to invest 
part of their resources in debt instruments issued by advanced economies with high 
credit ratings. Before the global financial crisis, these were considered safe 
investments. Recent events, however, demonstrate that even IOs might find 
themselves exposed to a sovereign credit risk. An important question therefore is 
whether international organizations should be entitled to claim a preferred creditor 
status granting them seniority over ordinary bondholders. Neither bond contracts, 
nor international law contain clear indications on the issue at stake. 
 
4.1 International financial institutions as bondholders: do they enjoy preferred 
creditor status? 
The Fifth Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement (which entered into 
force in February 2011) broadened the investment mandate of the Fund.85 The 
purposes of the changes introduced were to ensure the long-term sustainability of 
the Fund’s finances, and to make it less dependent on borrowing from member 
States and on earnings deriving from its lending activities. 
 
85 In particular, the Fifth Amendment modified Art. XII, Section 6(f)(iii) of the Articles of 
Agreement. See the IMF Executive Board Resolution No. 63-3: ‘Proposed Amendment of the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF to Expand the Investment Authority of the IMF’, 5 May 2008 in 
IMF, Summary Proceedings of the Sixty-Second Annual Meetings 2008, Washington DC, p. 209-
211. On the IMF new income model see B. Steinki and W. Bergthaler, “Recent Reforms of the 
Finances of the International Monetary Fund: An Overview” in C. Herrmann and J.P. Terhechte 
(eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (EYIEL), Vol. 3 (2012), European 
Yearbook of International Economic Law 3, pp. 635-666; S. Hagan, “Reforming the IMF”, in IMF, 
Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law: Restoring Financial Stability – The Legal 
Response, vol. 6, Washington DC, 2012, p. 253 ff. 
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Under the new income model, the Fund is allowed to invest part of its resources 
in fixed-income securities and cash instruments to generate returns exceeding the 
SDR interest rate.86  
However, the prudent risk profile of the Fund enables it to invest only in a limited 
group of assets which include: (a) fixed-income securities issued by national 
governments of member States, their central banks and official agencies; (b) fixed-
income securities issued by international financial institutions; (c) obligations of 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); all of which denominated in 
currencies included in the SDR basket (or denominated in SDR).87 
Credit risk is further minimized by restricting investments to financial 
instruments with a credit rating at least equivalent to A, based on the Standard & 
Poor’s rating scale. 88  The consequence is that the Fund’s external investment 
managers89 will be compelled to sell financial instruments in their portfolio as soon 
as these go below the rating threshold. This rigidity is even likely to increase the 
chances of the organization to bear losses.90 
While the IMF has only recently started to play an active role as an investor, the 
IBRD has a long history of buying and selling securities on the international capital 
markets for investment purposes.  
 
86 IMF, “Rules and Regulations for the Investment Account”, as lastly revised by the Executive 
Board the 29 July 2016, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-
Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Rules-and-Regulations-for-the-Investment-Account-PP4734, last visited 
9 June 2017. The Investment Account (IA) of the IMF is divided in different subaccounts (the Fixed-
Income Subaccount and the Endowment Subaccount). It holds resources transferred from the 
General Resources Account (GRA), which are to be invested to broaden the IMF’s income base. 
The earnings generated by the IA may be retained in the IA or transferred to the GRA to help meet 
the expenses of conducting the business of the IMF. 
87 These assets are eligible both for the shorter-duration Tranche 1 and the longer-duration 
Tranche 2 types of investments. Under the revised rules adopted in 2016, eligible investments in 
Tranche 1 now also include fixed-income securities issued by subnational governments, corporate 
bonds, mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities, and cash instruments.  
88 If the rating threshold is breached, assets shall be divested within three months from the rating 
downgrade.  
89 The assets in the IMF Investment Account are managed by external operators with a clear 
separation of responsibilities from the IMF management (the IMF Managing Director and the 
Executive Board).  
90 Rutsel S. J. Martha, “International Organizations Sovereign Bondholders: An Unexplored 
Dimension of the Sovereign Debt Crisis” (2013) Manchester Journal of International Economic 
Law, vol. 10, pp. 2-18, at 3. Besides, the World Bank Treasury currently manages the investment of 
over USD 100 billion in high-grade fixed-income portfolios in US dollars, Euros, Sterling and Yen 




The IBRD, though, has a less prudent investor profile. Pursuant to Art. IV, 
Section 8 (iv) of the Articles of Agreement, the IBRD can buy and sell such other 
securities as the Directors may deem proper for the investment by a three-fourths 
majority of the total voting power.91 In its Liquid Asset Portfolio, the IBRD holds 
principally high-grade fixed-income securities like government and agency 
obligations. 92  Only obligations rated AA- or more, issued or unconditionally 
guaranteed by a member country or by a multilateral organization, are eligible for 
IBRD’s investment. However, if they are denominated in the currency of the issuing 
State, no rating is required. Besides, the IBRD can also invest in corporate and 
asset-backed securities, time deposits and other unconditional obligations of banks 
and financial institutions and other instruments. 
In light of the above, it should be observed that, by investing on the sovereign 
bonds markets, the two Bretton Woods institutions are exposed to the risk of 
losses. 93  In case of a country’s default, the question as to whether these 
“supranational bondholders” should be shielded from a debt restructuring remains 
open.  
The preferred creditor status of the IMF, the World Bank and multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) might be relevant to solve this issue.  
 
91 The IBRD is also one of the major borrowers on the financial markets and raises most of its 
funds from the issuance of bonds (which carry an AAA rating because their repayment is guaranteed 
by its member States). 
92 Government and agency obligations amount to 60 per cent of the IBRD Liquid Asset Portfolio, 
which at the end of June 2016 was valued 50.5 billion USD. Source: IBRD Information Statement 
2016, available at http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/InformationStatement.pdf, last visited 16 
June 2017. 
93 This risk is well illustrated by the Hypo Alpe Adria case. In FY07 the IBRD had invested 
around 190 million USD in subordinated debt instruments of the Austrian bank, Hypo Alpe Adria, 
which was fully guaranteed by the State of Carinthia. In 2009, after years of high-risk project 
financing, mismanagement and corruption, the Austrian government nationalized the bank to avoid 
its insolvency. In August 2014, the Federal Law on the Reorganization of the Hypo Alpe Adria bank 
(HaaSanG) entered into force. The HaaSanG went well beyond a simple bail-in of HAA debt, it also 
cancelled the guarantee provided by the State of Carinthia. However, the applicable EU law – the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution directive (BBRD) – contains no basis for cancelling a guarantee by 
a third party. To the contrary, according to the BBRD, a regulatory resolution of a financial 
institution should leave creditors no worse off than they would have been under an insolvency 
proceeding. In July 2015, the Austrian Constitutional Court deemed the HaaSanG unconstitutional 
as in violation of the right to property and, accordingly, the security and related guarantees were 
reinstated (see VfGH Decision No. G 239/2015 ua, VfGH Press release 7/28/15). In October 2016, 
the IBRD eventually accepted a tender offer to exchange its bond for a new zero coupon bond 
maturing over 18 years. This zero coupon bond was later sold on the market for 79 million USD. 
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In the Articles of Agreement there is no explicit reference to the Fund’s preferred 
creditor status (PCS),94 nonetheless this privilege is recognized internationally by 
G20 countries and in the practice of the Paris Club.95  
In the 1980s, some authors expressed the view that the PCS of the IMF came 
from an international customary law norm.96 Others, however, contended that a 
general international law rule to this end had not arisen yet and that “decisions by 
some creditors [Paris club members] to extend de facto preferential status to IFIs 
[…] differ fundamentally from a legal right of being exempt, even though the 
private sector has often acquiesced”.97  
In the context of the so-called ‘protracted arrears crisis’ of 1983-1992,98 the 
same IMF had to acknowledge the feeble legal grounds for its preferred creditor 
status and it “urged all members, within the limits of their laws, to treat the Fund as 
a preferred creditor” (emphasis added).99 
 
94 See K. Raffer, ‘Preferred or Not Preferred: Thoughts on Priority Structures of Creditors’ 
(2009), paper prepared for discussions at the 2nd meeting of the ILA Sovereign Insolvency Study 
Group, 16 October 2009, available at http://homepage.univie.ac.at/kunibert.raffer/ila-wash.pdf (last 
visited 10 June 2017). 
95 See Rutsel S. J. Martha, ‘Preferred Creditor Status under International Law: The Case of the 
International Monetary Fund’, 39 Int’l and Comp L. Q., 1990, p. 814 ff.. At the October 2011 
meeting of Cannes, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors endorsed a document 
entitled Principles for Cooperation between the IMF and Regional Financial Arrangements. This 
soft law instrument acknowledges the importance of cooperation between the IMF and RFAs to 
promote regional and global financial and monetary stability. The G20 Principles do not establish a 
hierarchy between the IMF and the RFAs, if not for the preferred creditor status that is recognized 
to the IMF. This is also acknowledged by the European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM): “the 
ESM loans will enjoy preferred creditor status in a similar fashion to those of the IMF, while 
accepting preferred creditor status of the IMF over the ESM” (Preamble of the ESM Treaty, n. 13). 
Therefore, under normal practice, the debtor country will first repay the IMF, then the ESM, and 
last its private creditors (A. Mody, “Sovereign Debt and Its Restructuring Framework in the Euro 
Area”, (2013) Bruegel Working Paper 2013/05, p. 20-21). 
96 D. Carreau, ‘Le rééchelonnement de la dette extérieure des Etats’ (1985) 112 Journal du droit 
international 5, 15.   
97 See R.S.J. Martha, cit., (1990), at 825. 
98 By 1988, 13 countries were in protracted arrears (of six or more months) with the Fund. 
Arrears amounted to nearly 14 per cent of the outstanding IMF loans. 
99 ‘IMF Survey’, 17 October 1988, p. 326. See also Report of the Executive Board to the Interim 
Committee of the Board of Governors on Overdue Financial Obligations to the Fund, EBS/88/166, 
Rev. 2, 9 September 1988, p. 3: “Executive Directors have stressed the unique position of the Fund 
as an international cooperative institution, its role in the international monetary system, the revolving 
nature of its resources, and the consequent need for all members, creditors and debtors alike, in 
practice, to treat the Fund as a preferred creditor. Accordingly, all members should accord the 
highest priority to the settlement of financial obligations to the Fund”. For a comment and the text 
of this document, see J. M. Boughton, Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979-
1989 (2001), Washington, DC, IMF, p. 820-21 and 832. 
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It is however undisputed that, when the Fund provides financial assistance to a 
member State, its claims are de facto senior to those of all other creditors. 
It was also argued that, without preferred creditor status, the IMF would greatly 
limit its lending activities, especially in the case of countries struck by a debt 
crisis.100 In this sense, preferential treatment is considered essential to ensure that 
the IMF’s reserve assets remain risk-free. This ‘adequate safeguard’ (within the 
meaning of IMF Art. V, Section 3) reflects the global public good nature of the IMF 
financing, which is intended to restore the recipient country “external viability, thus 
also ensuring that the other creditors will have their restructured claims repaid”.101 
What seen for the IMF’s preferred creditor status applies also to the IBRD, IDA 
and MDBs.102 Their statutes do not contain a legal basis for preferential treatment, 
nor does general international law. Though, since they provide development 
financing, they are granted de facto priority. 103 
As stated above, when providing financial assistance, the IMF/IBRD preferred 
creditor status has rarely been challenged. The question is whether the same should 
apply when they act as mere investors in the capital markets. 
On the one hand, it could be argued that, when buying bonds on secondary 
markets (moreover through external managers), the IMF and the IBRD are 
 
100 S. Schadler, ‘The IMF’s Preferred Creditor Status: Does It Still Make Sense after the Euro 
Crisis?’, CIGI Policy Brief n. 37, March 2014. The Author concludes: “Ultimately, the case for or 
against PCS for the IMF comes down to how members wish to maintain discipline over IMF lending. 
There are two choices: discipline through rules, that is, a clear framework specifying minimum 
standards for the credibility that IMF programs will return a country to market access, or discipline 
through market forces, that is, subjecting IMF loans to the same risks of default or restructuring as 
private market lending”. 
101 IMF, ‘Review of Fund Facilities: Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options’, 6 
February 2009, 8. 
102 On this point see K. Raffer, cit. (2009), and K. Raffer, Debt Management for Development: 
Protection of the Poor and the Millennium Development Goals (2010), Cheltenham, 221 ff. The 
Author argues that, on the contrary, the IBRD founders wanted to subordinate the bank’s claims. 
103 It should be noted that even in the context of the HIPC initiative, the IMF and the IDA 
maintained their preferred creditor status. Debt relief was in fact provided in a way to formally 
guarantee that payments to the IMF/IDA were made as they became due. In practice, much of the 
debt relief was provided by a special Debt Relief Trust Fund, financed from income of the IBRD, 
or by special ESAF grants provided by the IMF; a portion of HIPC debt was also attributed directly 
to member States of the IDA as part of their IDA replenishment contributions. These funds were 
used to buy back or repay portions of the debt owed by HIPC countries to the IDA and the IMF; 
alternatively, the Trust Fund committed to pay a portion of the future debt service owed to 
multilateral creditors as it became due. See Leonie F. Guder, The Administration of Debt Relief by 
the International Financial Institutions: A Legal Reconstruction of the HIPC Initiative, Berlin, 
Springer, 2009, p. 49 ff.. See also IMF, ‘HIPC Initiative and MDRI: Statistical Update’, 19 
December 2013.  
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comparable to private investors. Hence, in the case of a debt restructuring, they will 
have to share an equal burden with any other bondholder. Since the commercial 
nature of the investment activity prevails over their public function, the IMF/IBRD 
should not be treated in a more favourable way than other private creditors. 
Therefore, the IMF/IBRD cannot avail themselves of the preferred creditor status 
they enjoy when they provide financial assistance to a member country.  
On the other hand, the opposite can be contended if one focuses on the purpose 
of the IMF/IBRD’s investments, which is to ensure the proper financing of their 
activities in the long run. In general, IFIs and MDBs do not approach liquidity 
investing in a commercial manner: their key goal is to preserve principal and 
maintain the ability to meet their public policy mandates, rather than income 
generation. Substantial amounts of liquidity are held by these organizations in order 
to be able to play a countercyclical role in times of financial turmoil.104 In this sense, 
it can be argued that even while engaging in a private sector activity, the IMF/IBRD 
are still pursuing their public-sector objectives and that consequently they should 
be granted preferred creditor status. If we agreed with this view, the bonds held by 
the IMF/IBRD could be rightfully exempted from a debt restructuring. 
This is precisely what happened to the bonds held by the ECB, the Eurosystem 
national central banks and the EIB in the context of the March 2012 Greek exchange 
offer, even if none of these supranational institutions has ever been acknowledged 
preferred creditor status. 
 
4.2 The exemption of the ECB, Eurosystem NCBs and the EIB from the Greek 
sovereign debt restructuring  
The IMF/IBRD investor status is indeed different from the one of the ECB, 
which purchased European sovereign bonds in the exercise of its monetary policy 
mandate and responding to public interest considerations.  
In May 2010, the ECB and the Eurosystem national central banks (NCBs) started 
to make outright purchases of sovereign bonds issued by governments of the Euro 
area on the secondary market (i.e. from banks and at market prices). These 
 




interventions were made under the legal framework of the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP),105 a monetary policy instrument adopted due to the exceptional 
circumstances that were hampering the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
in the Euro area.106 
As a result of the SMP purchases, in February 2012 the ECB was the single 
largest holder of Greek sovereign bonds, with 16.3 per cent of the total, amounting 
to €42.7 billion. Notably, purchases were made at a discount: spending about €40 
billion for bonds having a face value of €55 billion.107 The Eurosystem NCBs held 
around 5 per cent of the total Greek bonds, amounting to €13.5 billion, while the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) had invested for just 0.1 per cent of the total, 
amounting to €315 million. Their cumulative holdings amounted to more than 20 
per cent of the total outstanding bonds.108  
 
105 The SMP programme was discontinued in September 2012, when the ECB announced the 
introduction of the new Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT) under which secondary 
market purchases of public debt instruments will be carried out only if the sovereign concerned 
agrees to a EFSF/ESM financial reform programme and its attached conditionality. See ECB 
Decision of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities markets programme (ECB/2010/5), OJ L 124/8, 
20.5.2012. See also ECB, ‘The ECB’s Non-Standard Measures – Impact and Phasing Out’ (July 
2011) Monthly Bulletin 66; D Zandstra, ‘The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and Its Evolving 
Resolution’ (2011) 6 Capital Markets Law Journal 285-316, at 291. On the OMT, see ECB Press 
Release, ‘Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions’, 6 September 2012, www.ecb.int. 
The ECB Governing Council has not yet adopted a decision detailing the legal framework for the 
OMT programme. 
The SMP/OMT programmes were object of strong criticisms and they were challenged in front 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC). On 14 January 2014, the GFCC separated from 
the proceedings related to the ESM and to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union (the so-called Fiscal Compact) the matters related to the SMP 
and the OMT programmes. The proceedings related to the SMP/OMT were stayed and a referral for 
a preliminary ruling was submitted by the GFCC (for the first time in its history) to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union asking the CJEU to assess whether the OMT programme is covered 
by the monetary policy mandate of the ECB and whether the SMP/OMT programmes are consistent 
with the prohibition of monetary financing enshrined in Art. 123 TFEU. In the Gauweiler case, the 
Court ruled in favour of the compatibility of OMTs with Art. 123 TFEU (ECJ (Grand Chamber), 
Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400). On Gauweiler see, among others, the 
special section of the German Law Journal vol. 16, n. 4, 2015, pp. 917-1072 and the special issue 
“The European Court of Justice, The European Central Bank, and The Supremacy of EU Law” of 
the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 23, n. 1, 2016. The saga ended in 
June 2016, when the GFCC accepted the requirements set forth by the ECJ to restrain the OMT 
programme, should it become operational (BVerfG, Judgment of 21 June 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13. 
106  See Recital 2 of the ECB Decision of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities markets 
programme (ECB/2010/5), OJ L 124/8, 20.5.2012. 
107 See IMF, “Euro Area Policies: 2012 Article IV Consultation - Selected Issues Paper”, IMF 
Country Report No. 12/182, July 2012, p. 47. 
108 Sources: J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch, and M. Gulati, op. cit., p. 10. See also Morgan Stanley, 
“Trading After the PSI”, 8 March 2012. 
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During the restructuring, these supranational creditors were shielded from 
bearing any losses: in mid-February 2012, shortly before Greece launched its 
exchange offer, they swapped their “old” bonds for “new” bonds with identical 
nominal value, payment terms and maturity dates, but different ISIN serial 
numbers.109  
This was the only way to single out and aggregate bonds issued under different 
series. The new bonds were in fact protected from the debt swap that was carried 
out under the so-called private sector involvement (PSI) and performed by means 
of retroactive collective action clauses.110 
The Greek exchange offer in fact did not extend to bonds held by the ECB, Euro 
area NCBs and the EIB, but it did extend to retail and institutional bondholders as 
well as to other non-European sovereign bondholders and central banks.111 For 
instance, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global had to suffer a huge loss 
after having stocked up on Greek debt (and on bonds of Portugal, Spain and Italy) 
and having started to downsize its portfolio only at the end of 2011.112 
The exemption of supranational bondholders led to the development of a very 
unusual ladder of priorities among creditors and it was considered discriminatory 
in nature. 113  The result was that the claims of these European official sector 
institutions were de facto given priority, to the detriment of both retail and 
institutional investors.114  
While bondholders agreeing to the exchange offer received bonds maturing 
between 2023 and 2042 and suffered a huge haircut (53.5 per cent on their principal), 
 
109 The new bonds with different ISIN numbers (International Securities Identification Number) 
were kept outside the remit of the Greek Bondholder Act and therefore were not involved in the 
application of retroactive CACs. See IMF, “Euro Area Policies: 2012 Article IV Consultation - 
Selected Issues Paper”, IMF Country Report No. 12/182, July 2012, p. 47. 
110 On 23 February 2012, the Greek Parliament introduced Law 4050/2012 on Rules on the 
modification of titles issued or guaranteed by the Greek state with the Bondholders’ agreement 
(published in Government Gazette A 36/23.02.2012 of the Hellenic Republic), by which CACs were 
to be retroactively introduced on all Greek bonds issued before 31 December 2011. 
111 P. R. Wood, op. cit., pp. 3-50, at 5. 
112 Data on the Norwegian Government Pension Fund’s annual holdings from 1998 to 2016 are 
available at http://www.nbim.no/en/Investments/holdings-/, last visited 9 June 2017. 
113 According to the IIF Joint Committee on Strengthening the Framework for Sovereign Debt 
Crisis Prevention and Resolution, “the exclusion of the ECB holdings from the debt exchange could 
be rationalized […], but the exclusion of the official body holdings [NCBs and EIB] deviated from 
the normal principle of non-discrimination” (IIF, “Report of the Joint Committee on Strengthening 
the Framework for Sovereign Debt Crisis Prevention and Restructuring”, October 2012, p. 52). 
114 P. R. Wood, op. cit., p. 34. 
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the maturity dates of the bonds held by the ECB and the other supranational 
bondholders remained unvaried. 
The ECB would in fact receive the full face value of the Greek bonds it had 
purchased at significantly below par value in 2010 and it would also benefit from 
coupon payments, thus receiving preferential creditor status. 
The decision to grant preferential treatment to the ECB resulted in an aggravated 
sense of grievance on the part of the disfavoured creditors and it was harshly 
criticized. 
On the issue, it was observed that: “The larger the share of the privileged 
creditors becomes (protected against losses in case of a debt cut), the higher the 
default risks for the underprivileged (private) creditors rise”.115  
Furthermore, the fact that part of the money disbursed to Greece by the IMF and 
Euro area members was used to repay the ECB provoked a flood of indignant 
reactions.116 
Initially, the ECB argued that its exemption from the PSI was “special” and 
justified on the grounds that it had intervened on the bond markets solely for 
monetary policy purposes.117 In a second moment, however, the ECB declared that 
in similar situations it would be ready to be pari passu with private lenders.118  
 
115 K Schneider, ‘Questions and Answers: Karlsruhe’s Referral for a Preliminary Ruling to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2014) 15 (2) German Law Journal 234. 
116 A first group of bonds held by the ECB matured at the end of August 2012. While struggling 
with the austerity measures and spending cuts required by the Troika, Greece had to repay €3 billion. 
This, however, was only a fraction of the €55billion face value Greek bonds held by the ECB and 
by Eurosystem NCBs. 
117 According to Mario Draghi ‘the SMP was a monetary policy instrument. So the purchases of 
Greek bonds done under that program responded to public interest policy – general policy 
considerations. And as such, they deserve protection.’ (M Draghi, President of the ECB, ‘Transcript 
of the Press Conference’, 8 March 2012, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120308.en.html). 
118 This will apply to sovereign bond purchases made via the OMT programme.  
It is worth mentioning that in Gauweiler, cit., par. 126 the ECJ ruled that “although the lack of 
privileged creditor status may mean that the ECB is exposed to the risk of a debt cut decided upon 
by the other creditors of the Member State concerned, it must be stated that such a risk is inherent 
in a purchase of bonds on the secondary markets, an operation which was authorized by the authors 
of the Treaties, without being conditional upon the ECB having privileged creditor status”.  
A few months later, however, in the Accorinti case (see below), the General Court of the 
European Union held incidentally that “in so far as a rule which imposed the pari passu principle 
would entail equal treatment for creditors without taking into account the distinct situations of, in 
particular, private investors, on the one hand, and the Eurosystem central banks, acting in the 
exercise of their tasks pursuant to Article 127 TFEU and Article 18 of the Statute, on the other hand, 
the recognition of such a rule in the EU legal order might well be incompatible with the principle of 
equal treatment”. Case T-79/13 Accorinti and Others v. ECB, ECLI:EU:T:2015:756, par. 100. 
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Strong criticism was also raised over the fact that part of the money provided by 
the IMF and through the Greek Loan Facility set up by Euro area member States 
was to be used to repay the ECB.119  
This led the ECB to commit to return any profits on its Greek bond holdings to 
its shareholders on the basis of their capital subscription (i.e. both Euro and non-
Euro area NCBs, with the latter receiving a smaller percentage).120 
More recently, the General Court of the European Union121 held that in the wake 
of the Greek PSI the ECB was exclusively guided by public interest objectives and, 
particularly, by the goal of maintaining price stability and the sound administration 
of monetary policy. Therefore, private investors – who purchased Greek bonds 
pursuing a “purely private interest, namely obtaining a maximum return on their 
investments”122 – and the ECB were not in a comparable situation and the general 
principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination could not apply. 
 
4.3 The application of collective action clauses to supranational bondholders 
For the purposes of our research, it is interesting to discuss whether, for the 
activation of collective action clauses (CACs), supranational bondholders should 
be assimilated to private bondholders. 
 
119 A first group of bonds held by the ECB matured at the end of August 2012. While struggling 
with the austerity measures and spending cuts required by the Troika, Greece had to repay €3 billion. 
120 Later, in November 2012, Euro area member States undertook to transfer on a segregated 
account established in the Bank of Greece “an amount equivalent to the income on the SMP portfolio 
accruing to their NCBs”. See Eurogroup Statement on Greece, 27 November 2012, available at 
http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/367646/eurogroup_statement_greece_27_november_2012.
pdf, last visited 9 June 2017. See also ECB Monthly Bulletin, December 2012, p. 44. Transfers 
under this scheme were made conditional on the implementation by Greece of austerity measures 
and the requirements and objectives of the adjustment programme. Euroarea Member States 
receiving financial assistance by the EFSF/ESM were not required to participate in the scheme. The 
segregated account can be exclusively used for debt service payments and to redeem maturing bonds.  
121 EU General Court, Case T-79/13 Accorinti and Others v. ECB, ECLI:EU:T:2015:756, par. 
88, 91, 93 ff.. See also EU General Court, Case T-749/15, Nausicaa v. ECB, ECLI:EU:T:2017:21, 
par. 108 ff. See among other O. Heinz, “Issues and Possible Reforms in the Context of a Euro 
Area/EU Sovereign Insolvency Framework” in ESCB Legal Conference 2016, Frankfurt-am-Main, 
January 2017, p. 99 ff. 
See also ECtHR, Mamatas and Others v. Greece, Judgement of 21 July 2016, Application Nos. 
63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14. 
122 Accorinti, cit. par. 91. 
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CACs are based on the presumption that all bondholders are to be treated equally 
and that there is no ranking amongst the holders of the same bond issue (or of the 
aggregated bond series).  
CACs are contractual provisions allowing a supermajority of bondholders to 
modify the features of a bond issue, including its payment terms, and make the 
amendments binding also for dissenting minorities. In principle, no distinction is 
made among the various categories of investors. Therefore, the difficulty resides in 
achieving a common position and defining who is entitled to vote.  
Some market players have expressed the concern that a sovereign could take 
advantage of majority amendment clauses, by buying back – either directly or 
through entities under its control – a sufficient amount of a bond issue to vote for a 
more favourable restructuring, to the detriment of the other bondholders. 
To prevent this scenario, a so-called “disenfranchisement provision” is 
sometimes included in sovereign bond contracts to protect ordinary creditors, and 
especially retail investors, from a manipulation of votes.123 Pursuant to this clause, 
bonds directly or indirectly in the hands of the issuer are excluded from the quorum 
required to amend the terms. 
The question is whether supranational bondholders should be disenfranchised. 
The public policy objectives they presumably pursue – in conformity with their 
treaty or statute obligations – differ from those of both the debtor State and of 
private bondholders. However, provided that bondholders are not directed by the 
issuer’s will, their motivations are irrelevant and therefore also supranational 
bondholders should be enfranchised.124 
While developing a EU CAC Model,125 the view was expressed that “neither an 
investor’s interests or motives, nor the predictability of an investor’s vote for or 
 
123 See K. Drake, “Disenfranchisement in Sovereign Bonds” (2012) Duke Law Working Paper, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2007294. 
124 C. Hofmann, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring in Europe Under the New Model Collective 
Action Clauses’ (2014) 49 Texas International Law Journal 407. 
125 In 2011, the EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets started working on a 
standardized CAC to be included in new sovereign debt instruments issued by EU member States. 
See EFC, ‘CACs Common Terms of Reference’, 17 February 2012, 
europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf, as well as EFC, Supplemental 
Provisions, 17 February 2012, europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-
_supplemental_provisions.pdf. On this point see Chapter xxx by Giuseppe Bianco. According to the 
Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (Art. 12.3), all new euro area government 
securities with maturity above one year and issued after January 2013 should include a CAC. 
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against a proposed modification, constitutes adequate grounds for disenfranchising 
an investor. […] the litmus test remains: is a bondholder acting in its own interest? 
If so, the bondholder should be enfranchised”.126 
The final EU CAC Model grants voting power to the holders of bonds with 
autonomy of decision from the issuer “since, under the applicable law, [they are] 
prohibited from taking, directly or indirectly, instructions from the issuer on how 
to vote on a proposed modification”.127 
It should be underlined that this provision was discussed when the SMP 
programme was in force and contains an implicit reference to the ECB and the 
Eurosystem NCBs. Since their independence is protected by the EU Treaties,128 
their disenfranchisement is not necessary. 
A similar disenfranchisement provision is included in the recently amended 
ICMA Standard Aggregated CACs.129  
As for the IMF and IBRD, their willingness to preserve their preferred creditor 
status might direct them to vote against any proposed restructuring of the bonds 
they hold. Even in this case, however, they will retain complete autonomy of 
decision from the issuer and therefore, according to the actual CACs rationale, they 
will be enfranchised. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Over the years, the features of sovereign debt restructuring have been shaped by 
the nature of the debt and of its creditors. 
Both the Paris and the London Clubs were formed to restructure debts owed by 
a State to a homogeneous group of creditors: respectively, official bilateral creditors 
and commercial banks. 
 
126 See EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, “Model Collective Action Clause 
Supplemental Explanatory Note”, 26 March 2012, available at 
http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/supplemental_explanatory_note_on_the_model_cac_-
_26_march_2012.pdf, p. 6.  
127 Section 2.7, lett. c (x, y, z) of the European Model CAC. 
128 See Article 130 TFEU and Article 7 of the ECB Statute. They do not enjoy preferred creditor 
status. 
129 See ICMA, “Standard Aggregated Collective Action Clauses (CACs) for the Terms and 
Conditions of Sovereign Notes”, lett. (i) Notes controlled by the Issuer, August 2014, available at 
http://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/ (last visited 10 June 2017). 
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At present, although most of the debt being restructured is in the form of 
sovereign bonds, a dedicated workout mechanism is still developing. In this new 
scenario, the principles and practices developed by the Paris and the London Clubs 
can be only of a limited use. 
In fact, compared to the Paris Club rule of adopting decision by consensus and 
the London Club practice of deciding by unanimity, sovereign bond restructurings 
are currently primarily based on CACs and majority voting. 
An IMF supported-programme (typically requested both by the Paris and 
London Clubs) is not always seen as a necessary precondition to start discussions 
on sovereign bond restructurings. 
Representation is the main issue, as typically bondholders are not represented in 
a committee and only the last generation of CACs envisions their formation. 
Moreover, the challenges posed by the heterogeneousness of bondholders – and 
by supranational bondholders in particular – are yet to be carefully addressed. 
If the ECB exemption from the Greek debt restructuring of 2012 was motivated 
on grounds of public interest considerations, would the IMF and the IBRD be 
allowed to claim preferred creditor status in relation to their sovereign bonds 
investments? 
Deference to their PCS is a likely outcome, but the establishment of a ladder of 
priorities among bondholders with supranational creditors at the top might threaten 
one of the basic tenets of the CACs approach: the equal status of bondholders. 
 
 
